Not surprisingly, only 1.34 million hectares out of 4.66 million hectares of irrigable land was actually irrigated. Only 17 percent of the Philippine road network was paved, compared to the 82 percent in Thailand and 75 percent in Malaysia. Crop yield across the board was anemic, with the average yield in rice of 2.87 MT per hectare way below average yields in China, Vietnam, and 81 Thailand. Confronted with governments that played an aggressive, activist role in protecting and promoting their agriculture not only in the US and the EU but in the neighboring Asian countries as well, the Philippines was ill-equipped to enter the AOA. To prevent the agricultural sector from becoming a roadblock to the ratification of the WTO agreement, the Ramos administration promised to appropriate and release funds for agricultural modernization and safety nets. The fund promised-called the Department of Agriculture Action Plan-totaled Php 128 billion, to be released at the rate of Php32 billion annually. The figure included "Php27 billion for the improvement of irrigation facilities, Php8 billion for the construction of farm-to-market roads, Php 762 million for the improvement of post- harvest facilities, and Php64 million for the installation of grain centers."83 However, according to one agricultural expert, only 44 percent of the Php 32 billion promised for 1995 was appropriated. Of this amount, funding for new projects-i.e.. projects begun after ratification of the WTO agreement-amounted to the exceedingly small sum of Php2.8 billion. In 1996, the proposed Php32 billion was reduced to Php 14.6 billion, of which the funding for new projects was, at Php2.2 billion, even lower than the 1995 figure." Seven years later, the Department of Agriculture admitted that only 50 percent of the proposed Department of Agriculture Action Plan had been released.85 84 The failure of the safety net program was supposed to be addressed by the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act (AFMA) passed in 1998 which provided for comprehensive government assistance covering such areas as irrigation, post-harvest facilities, credit and financing, and research and development. But, as one report noted, "despite having a legislated annual budgetary allocation, AFMA was not able to take off the ground as government could not even meet the annual budgetary needs of the Department of Agriculture." What limited amounts were appropriated of the original proposed Php35 billion safety net program, some charged, were largely diverted to urban projects such as flyovers during the Ramos period.87 During the ratification debate, pro-WTO advocates promoted the vision that the AOA would create a situation where the Philippines would fill production niches in which it would have the "comparative advantage" such as the cultivation of high-value-added export crops such as cutflowers, asparagus, broccoli, and snow peas. These advocates, such as then-Secretary of Agriculture Roberto Sebastian, did not do their homework. The shift to high value "non-traditional agricultural exports" (NTAES) requires investment that is simply not within the reach of small producers. For instance, in the case of cutflowers, data from Ecuador reveals an average initial capital investment of $200,000 per hectare. Annual input costs are also high, with the costs of agrochemicals alone coming to over $18,900 per hectare. 88 In the case of snow peas, broccoli, and cauliflower, annual production costs, according to data from Guatemala, comes to $3,145, $1,096, and $971 per hectare respectively, compared to $219 per hectare for corn.89 Moreover, competitive advantage in these crops can only be achieved through significant outlays in technological support and research and development. As many analysts have pointed​

1. Not surprisingly, only 1.34 million hectares out of 4.66 million hectares of irrigable land was actually irrigated. Only 17 percent of the Philippine road network was paved, compared to the 82 percent in Thailand and 75 percent in Malaysia. Crop yield across the board was anemic, with the average yield in rice of 2.87 MT per hectare way below average yields in China, Vietnam, and 81 Thailand. Confronted with governments that played an aggressive, activist role in protecting and promoting their agriculture not only in the US and the EU but in the neighboring Asian countries as well, the Philippines was ill-equipped to enter the AOA. To prevent the agricultural sector from becoming a roadblock to the ratification of the WTO agreement, the Ramos administration promised to appropriate and release funds for agricultural modernization and safety nets. The fund promised-called the Department of Agriculture Action Plan-totaled Php 128 billion, to be released at the rate of Php32 billion annually. The figure included "Php27 billion for the improvement of irrigation facilities, Php8 billion for the construction of farm-to-market roads, Php 762 million for the improvement of post- harvest facilities, and Php64 million for the installation of grain centers."83 However, according to one agricultural expert, only 44 percent of the Php 32 billion promised for 1995 was appropriated. Of this amount, funding for new projects-i.e.. projects begun after ratification of the WTO agreement-amounted to the exceedingly small sum of Php2.8 billion. In 1996, the proposed Php32 billion was reduced to Php 14.6 billion, of which the funding for new projects was, at Php2.2 billion, even lower than the 1995 figure." Seven years later, the Department of Agriculture admitted that only 50 percent of the proposed Department of Agriculture Action Plan had been released.85 84 The failure of the safety net program was supposed to be addressed by the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act (AFMA) passed in 1998 which provided for comprehensive government assistance covering such areas as irrigation, post-harvest facilities, credit and financing, and research and development. But, as one report noted, "despite having a legislated annual budgetary allocation, AFMA was not able to take off the ground as government could not even meet the annual budgetary needs of the Department of Agriculture." What limited amounts were appropriated of the original proposed Php35 billion safety net program, some charged, were largely diverted to urban projects such as flyovers during the Ramos period.87 During the ratification debate, pro-WTO advocates promoted the vision that the AOA would create a situation where the Philippines would fill production niches in which it would have the "comparative advantage" such as the cultivation of high-value-added export crops such as cutflowers, asparagus, broccoli, and snow peas. These advocates, such as then-Secretary of Agriculture Roberto Sebastian, did not do their homework. The shift to high value "non-traditional agricultural exports" (NTAES) requires investment that is simply not within the reach of small producers. For instance, in the case of cutflowers, data from Ecuador reveals an average initial capital investment of $200,000 per hectare. Annual input costs are also high, with the costs of agrochemicals alone coming to over $18,900 per hectare. 88 In the case of snow peas, broccoli, and cauliflower, annual production costs, according to data from Guatemala, comes to $3,145, $1,096, and $971 per hectare respectively, compared to $219 per hectare for corn.89 Moreover, competitive advantage in these crops can only be achieved through significant outlays in technological support and research and development. As many analysts have pointed​

Explanation:

moreover competitive is support heactare for corn